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Abstract
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on
their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this mar-
ket has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for de-
sired levels of service. We argue that this is due to the absence of
a dominant strategy equilibrium in the current fee mechanism. We
propose an alternative fee setting mechanism that is inspired by gen-
eralized second price auctions. The design of such a mechanism is
challenging because miners can use any criteria for including transac-
tions and can manipulate the results of the auction after seeing the
proposed fees. Nonetheless, we show that our proposed protocol is
free from manipulation as the number of users increases. We further
show that, for a large number of users and miners, the gain from
manipulation is small for all parties. This results in users proposing
fees that represent their true utility and lower variance of revenue for
miners. Historical analysis shows that Bitcoin users could have saved
$272,528,000 USD in transaction fees while miners could have reduced
the variance of fee income by an average factor of 7.4 times.
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1 Introduction
Almost all decentralized cryptocurrencies use the same basic mechanism to
prioritize transactions. First, users attach a fee to each transaction. Then,
miners choose the highest paying transactions to include in the blocks. Upon
inclusion, the users pay the fee that was attached to their transaction. This
mechanism plays a crucial role in these cryptocurrencies as they subsidize
miners to keep constructing the chain as well as ensuring that the capacity
of the network is being used efficiently. As the baseline subsidy to miners
(the block reward) goes to zero and the popularity of these cryptocurren-
cies increases, the income from transaction fees will take on an even more
prominent role.
In practice, this mechanism has been very unstable. In Bitcoin, the av-
erage daily fee paid in June 2018 ranged from $0.58 to $6.85. In December
2017, during a period of heavy trading activity, the average daily fee ranged
from $5.82 to $61.44. For users, this volatility makes it very difficult to
decide what fee to attach to a transaction and results in a poor user experi-
ence. Users who bid a low fee are dissatisfied by a long wait time, and the
potential for their transaction to be dropped, while users who bid too high
may have overbid to get confirmed. Additionally, the unpredictability in fees
drastically changes the mining rewards on a day-to-day basis. During June
2018, the total daily transaction fees earned by miners ranged from $11,300
to $1,348,000, while in December 2017, the total daily transaction fees ranged
from $2,039,984 to $23,167,981. This makes it difficult for miners to make
long term profitability plans.
While we use Bitcoin (BTC) as a case study for designing a functional
fee market, our techniques can be fairly easily adapted to other decentralized
cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin is a decentralized system in which users can attach
fees of any amount to a transaction and miners can include any such trans-
actions in a block. Typically, miners put high fee transactions into the block
and leave low ones out. So the fee a user offers can affect the waiting time
that user experiences for his transaction to be recorded. However, as the rate
at which blocks are built and their size are both fixed by the protocol, fees
do not result in more transactions being included and they affect average
waiting times only if high fees discourage some users from participating in
the system. As long as miner revenue induces enough miners to participate
for security (total miner daily revenue ranged between $10 million and $17
2
million in June, 2018), these fees are a social waste.1 Indeed, most mining
rewards in Bitcoin today are from the block reward and fees play only a small
role in increasing miner revenue. As there is free entry into mining, expected
miner profit is unchanged by fees. Thus, fees only change which transactions
get processed first.
Bitcoin’s market mechanism to prioritize transactions is essentially a gen-
eralized first price auction for space on the block. Here, the users act as
bidders while miners are the auctioneers. First price auctions, or generalized
first price auctions for multiple items, are problematic. In a first price auc-
tion for multiple, identical items, the highest bidder pays his bid and gets the
first item, the second highest bidder pays his bid and gets the second item,
and so on until either items or bidders are exhausted. These auctions do not
have a dominant strategy equilibrium, and although Bayes Nash equilibria
do exist and are efficient for generalized first price auctions for identical items
with symmetric bidders, these equilibria are unlikely to occur in practice. In
Bitcoin, this results in users not revealing the full utility of their transaction
in the fees, instead preferring to bid low at first and increase their bid only if
their transaction is taking too long to be confirmed. This strategic bidding
leads to the observed fee instability in Bitcoin.
We propose a mechanism based on second price auctions, which should
perform better in practice. This mechanism has a simple goal: to enable more
stable, predictable fees in cryptocurrenties. This will disincentivize users
from bidding strategically and prevent users from suffering from long wait
times due to underbidding or overpaying for a transaction by overbidding.
Miners will also gain a more predictable revenue stream that will increase as
the demand for block space increases. Additionally, since rational users will
not underbid strategically, miners can potentially earn more revenue from
transaction fees as well. In total, our mechanism will allow for a more stable,
well behaved fee market.
While it may seem straightforward to apply the existing auction literature
to cryptocurrencies, there are a few characteristics of the domain that make
it difficult to simply translate existing results. First, when a user sets a fee,
they are allowed to view most of the previous bids made by other users.
Also, a user is able to adjust the fee that they set, but they are only allowed
to increase their bid in discrete amounts using a technique called child pays
1See Easley, O’Hara and Basu [2017] and Huberman, Leshno and Moallemi [2017] for
analyses of transaction fees, the mining game and waiting times for users.
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for parent.2 Further, miners, acting as auctioneers, are allowed to place any
transactions they want in a block including creating fee-paying transactions
on the fly to manipulate the fee mechanism. The protocol only controls what
each user will pay for the transactions as well as the reward earned by the
miner given the set of transactions chosen by the miner. This mechanism will
be applied by all nodes and miners cannot deviate from this mechanism in any
way. Miners and users are allowed to construct secret transactions that are
not known to everyone, which allows miners to freely manipulate the auction
mechanism that is used. There are two large classes of such transactions: fake
bids that are submitted for the express purpose of manipulating the auction
mechanism or transactions that have some intrinsic value to the miner. These
limitations are inherent to most decentralized cryptocurrencies.
Our mechanism is based on an adaptation of the generalized second price
auction to cryptocurrencies. For our mechanism we show that as the num-
ber of users increases, users’ gain from bidding strategically converges to
zero. This result shows that users have a nearly dominant strategy of bid-
ding truthfully, especially as adoption increases. Additionally, we show that
as adoption increases, the miner’s gain from manipulating the transactions
they include in a block also converges to zero. We show this result both
empirically through simulations on real distributions and theoretically for
certain distributions as well. Hence, our mechanism is also resistant to a
malicious miner manipulating the transactions they include in a block.
There are several recent papers that analyze the the current Bitcoin pro-
tocol, the games it induces and its efficiency or the lack thereof, and at least
one paper that proposes an alternative protocol. Easley, O’Hara and Basu
[2017] and Huberman, Leshno and Moallemi [2017] provide analyses of trans-
action fees, the mining game and waiting times for users in the current Bitcoin
protocol. Huoy [2014] and Cong, He and Li [2018] provide analyses of the
mining game. Boehm, Christin, and Moore [2015], Harvey [2016], Malinova
and Park [2016], Raskin and Yermack [2016, 2017], and Aune, Krellenstein,
2Although users can observe the bids of other users and increase bids in response to
their observations, we believe that analyzing the bidding game for a single block as a
first-price, sealed-bid auction is appropriate for three reasons. First, users only have an
approximate idea of what miners know so they don’t get perfect information about the
bids in the mempool. Second, users don’t know when a block is going to be mined so they
don’t know when they need to be among the highest bidders. Third, the dispersion of bids
we observe in Bitcoin is inconsistent with all users conditioning on others bids and only
bidding enough to be among the successful users.
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O’Hara, and Slama [2017] all analyze aspects of the Bitcoin environment.
Rosenfeld [2011], Eyal and Sirer [2014], Gans and Halaburda [2015], and
Gandel and Halaburda [2016] consider various design issues of the Bitcoin
protocol mostly focusing on security rather than on the efficiency of the fee
mechanism.
The most closely related work is the monopolistic miner protocol of Lavi,
Sattath and Zohar [2017].3 They propose a protocol in which the winning
miner decides how many transactions to put into the block and charges all
of them the lowest fee proposed by any transaction he placed in that block.
There are fundamental differences between our approaches stemming from
our goals and setup. Lavi, Sattah and Zohar [2017] assume a single monopo-
listic miner, and strive to maximize revenue from fees at a cost of lower social
welfare. In contrast, our work explicitly targets maximizing social welfare,
and operates under a model with many miners. In their system, the monop-
olistic miner is incentivized to leave transactions offering positive fees out of
the block even if there is space in the block as including them reduces the
uniform price he can charge. This, of course, maximizes miner revenue, but
we believe that the first criterion for a viable protocol must be to use the
blockchain efficiently, as otherwise users are discouraged from participation.
Their non-manipulation result is stronger than the one we obtain from our
mechanism since we only obtain declining gain from manipulation as the sys-
tem grows, but it comes at a cost of lower social welfare and desirable metrics
such as transaction throughput and latency. Finally, in both our protocol
and the protocol proposed by Lavi, Sattah and Zohar [2017], users’ incentive
to behave strategically vanishes as the number of users grows.
In the rest of the paper, we first discuss the positive and negative aspects
of using a multi-unit first price auction for slots on the Bitcoin blockchain.
We then argue that auction theory and experience from the sponsored search
search market suggests alternatives to the Bitcoin protocol. We adapt ideas
from second price auctions and the VCG (Vickery-Clarke-Groves) procedure
to the trustless, decentralized setting present in Bitcoin. Most importantly,
in Bitcoin, prices charged to users cannot depend on bids from users who do
not get on the blockchain and the miners cannot commit to not manipulate
an auction. We show that a simple modification of standard results does
apply to Bitcoin and we show how to create a superior protocol using those
3Yao [2018] provides proofs of conjectures from Lavi, Sattath and Zohar [2017] about
the general incentive compatibility and profitability of their monopolistic miner protocol.
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results.
2 Auction Theory and Sponsored Search
To understand the challenges and opportunities from auction design, it is
useful to draw on the experiences of the sponsored search market.4 Over-
ture, the first company to use keyword-based advertising, initially sold ads
using a generalized first price auction. In the sponsored search market, ad-
vertising slots on the page that appears in response to a search term are sold
to advertisers. Slots near the top of the page are preferred to ones down the
page and all of these dominate those on the second page, and so on. Auctions
are run frequently to determine whose ad appears where. Overture and its
advertisers experienced instability: bids in successive auctions would rise as
those priced out in one auction tried to get into the next one; and then they
would crash once bids reached levels that discouraged bidding at all. See
Figure 1, reproduced from Edelman and Ostrovsky [2007], for an illustration
of the saw-tooth behavior of bids in the Overture first price auction. Even-
tually, discouraged buyers quit and the auction was clearly producing less
revenue than should be possible.
An important aspect of Google’s subsequent success in the sponsored
search market was based on its use of a superior auction form: GSP, Google’s
generalization of the single-unit second price auction to their multi-unit en-
vironment (multiple slots on the page). GSP does not have dominant strate-
gies, but it is second-price-like, it is simple and it seems to work reasonably
well. An alternative generalization of the single item second price auction
to multiple items that does have dominant strategies is the Vickery-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) procedure which forms the basis of the mechanism that Face-
book uses to sell advertising.
Auction theory and the experience of the sponsored search market suggest
that some generalization of the second price auction could be used to improve
on the Bitcoin protocol. Before modifying a second price auction to fit the
bitcoin environment it’s useful to first set out our objectives in designing a
protocol and then to describe how multi-unit second price auctions work.
We have three objectives. First, the protocol should result in an efficient
assignment of slots on each block to users of Bitcoin. So we want to assign
4See Easley and Kleinberg [2010], Chapter 15 for a discussion of the sponsored search
market and references to the literature on sponsored search.
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slots to users with the highest values, leaving a user out of a block only if there
is no user in the block who has a lower (true) value than the left-out user. An
assignment with this property is called socially optimal. Second, we want the
game induced by the protocol to incentivize non-strategic behavior. Ideally,
we would like users’ optimal bids (the fees they propose to pay) to be their
true values for slots and we would like the miner building the block to have no
profit motive for deviating from the “rules of the auction.” Third, we want
optimal strategies to be simple and obvious. This last criterion is difficult
to quantify, but a protocol that induces a game in which every participant
(both users and miners) has (weakly) dominant truth-telling strategies surely
satisfies it.
In the standard auction environment, which does not fit the bitcoin envi-
ronment perfectly, a generalized second price auction achieves these goals.5
A generalized second price auction for K identical items to be sold to bid-
ders who each want at most one item works as follows. Bidders are asked
to submit bids to the seller, or to the algorithm running the auction. The
bidders who have submitted the K highest bids each win an item and they
all pay the (K + 1)st highest bid. If the algorithm (auctioneer) can commit
to this auction form, and if bidders private valuations for an item are iid
draws from a fixed distribution, then it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for
each bidder to bid truthfully—submit a bid equal to his value for an item.
If such a dominant strategy did not exist, then although there may be a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, or multiple equilibria, they may be complex. Such
complex equilibria make it unclear whether or not we should expect to see
equilibrium bidding in practice. This auction form has another attractive
feature—it guarantees that those who win are the ones who place the high-
est values on the items, so it results in an efficient assignment of items to
bidders. It does not maximize the seller’s expected payoff; doing that re-
quires the seller to set a minimum bid at which an item will be sold and to
reject any bids below that even if this results in unsold items.6 The following
remark summarizes standard results about multi-unit auctions.
5We call this a “generalized” second price auction as it is an auction for K items at
the (K + 1)st highest bid rather than an auction for one item at the second highest bid.
It is not the GSP procedure used by Google.
6This auction is equivalent to the VCG procedure. It is simpler to explain than VCG,
but its optimality does depend on the items being identical. VCG does not require that
restriction.
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Remark: Suppose that each bidder wants at most one item and that bidders’
values are drawn iid from a distribution on [0, V¯ ]. Suppose also that the
auctioneer has K identical items for sale and can commit to an auction form.
1. If the auctioneer runs a generalized second price auction—the K items
are sold to the K highest bidders at the K+ 1st highest bid—then it is
a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his true value, and
if each bidder follows this dominant strategy, the assignment induced
by the auction is efficient
2. If the number of bidders and the distribution of values is common
knowledge, and the auctioneer runs a generalized first price auction—
the K items are sold to the K highest bidders and each successful
bidder pays his own bid—then there is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
the game induced by the auction in which the assignment is efficient.
For the environment described in the Remark, generalized first price auc-
tions and generalized second price auctions both result in socially optimal
assignments, so it’s reasonable to ask why the second price-like auction does
better than the first price-like auction in sponsored search. The difference
is the complexity of the strategies, the knowledge required to find optimal
strategies, and the notion of equilibrium. In the second price auction each
bidder only needs to know his own value and the form of the auction. Bid-
ding truthfully is optimal regardless of who the other bidders are or how
they behave. This is not true in the first price auction. Here, the efficiency
claim rests on the assumption that play can be described by a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in which each bidder is best responding to each other bidder.
To illustrate the difference in these two auctions, it is useful to examine
them in the simplest case in which there is a single item for sale to N bidders
with values, Vi, drawn iid from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. In a second
price auction, it’s weakly dominant for each bidder i to simply bid his value
Vi. In a first price auction there is an equilibrium in which the optimal
strategy for a bidder with value Vi is to bid (
N−1
N
)Vi. This, of course, requires
knowledge of the number of bidders; it depends on distribution of values being
uniform; and, it is optimal only if all other bidders follow the same strategy.
It does result in an efficient allocation because equilibrium bids are increasing
in true values.7
7Both auctions also yield the same expected revenue for the seller (in equilibrium). For
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Improving on the current first price auction in the bitcoin environment is
not as straightforward as simply adopting a generalized second price auction
or the VCG procedure. Bitcoin is a trustless, decentralized system in which
there is no central authority who can force all miners to commit to acting
as if they are the auctioneer in a generalized second price auction. The fee
setting game is not in fact an auction and there is no trusted auctioneer. So
any protocol has to take into account the incentives of the miners to follow
the “rules” of the auction rather than to manipulate it. Second, only the
miner knows the transactions and their attached fees in his mempool. Once
he writes transactions to the blockchain the details of those transactions
are known, but details of the transactions he leaves out are not known—
and the protocol cannot credibly call for payments that depend on those
left-out transactions. Even worse, there is a lag between when the block
is constructed and when the block is mined where new bids can appear.
This makes it impossible for anyone but the miner to know the bids that
are involved when constructing the block. So the generalized second price
auction, selling K items at the K + 1st highest bid, is not feasible as the
uniform price is not publicly observable. The incentives the miner has to
manipulate the auction are even more problematic and we discuss them next.
The winning miner has no mechanism allowing him to commit to an
auction form.8 Most importantly, the miner can also act as a user and include
his own transactions into the block he is mining, moving money from one of
his wallets to another with whatever fee he chooses after observing the fees
offered by users. All identities on the blockchain (miners, users, etc) are
uniquely identified by a cryptographic key. Thus, it is cheap to create a new
identity, but hard to assume the identity of another person. This makes it
difficult to enforce roles for each participant since it is possible for a miner to
the example in the text a simple calculation shows this, but it’s true much more generally
according to Myerson’s Revenue Equivalence Theorem, Myerson [1981].
8Akbarpour and Li [2018] provide an analysis of mechanisms in which the seller can
deviate from the rules of the auction. In this case, the mechanism has to be incentive
compatible for the seller. They show that a first price auction is the only credible static
auction. Essentially, an auctioneer could announce a different auction, such as a second
price auction, but then once bids are received, he can submit a false second highest bid just
below the actual highest bid—turning the auction into a first price auction. Credibility
also matters for our analysis as our miner can submit own bids; but our environment
differs as there are multiple items for sale, the mechanism can impose some constraints on
the miners, and, most importantly, miners revenue can depend on the fees generated by a
sequence of blocks determined by the protocol.
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also impersonate other, arbitrarily many, identities which all act as “users”.
This ability to also act as a “user” or many “users” allows a miner who
earns the revenue generated by the block to introduce first-price-like features
into a supposedly second price auction at zero cost to himself as he pays
the fee on his fictitious transaction to himself. To see this in the simplest
case, suppose that there is only one transaction in the block. The miner can
include a fictitious transaction paying a fee equal to the highest offered real
fee, ensuring that the user with the highest offered fee wins and pays that fee.
This makes the single item, “second price” auction with a strategic auctioneer
effectively a first price auction. So bidders should place first price bids and
in equilibrium, we should see a first price outcome. Nonetheless, we show
that with multiple bidders and multiple slots on the block, a generalization
of the second price auction can be useful.
The explanation above applies to a static (one-shot) auction. Neither
the sponsored search market nor the blockchain game are static. In spon-
sored search, auctions are run frequently and an advertiser who does not win
now can change his bid and perhaps win in a subsequent auction. In the
blockchain game, a user who does not get onto the current block can revise
his fee offer and, after waiting longer, perhaps get onto the next block. Most
of the sponsored search literature ignores this dynamic feature although there
is recent work on dynamic sponsored search auctions.9 We will take waiting
time into account indirectly, through users differing values for a spot on the
block and we will make use of a sequence of blocks, but we will analyze the
users’ blockchain game only one block at a time.
3 Model
We consider a generic model applicable to a broad range of cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrencies construct blocks with a fixed number of slots, K, that can
be filled with users’ transactions selected by the miner who is building this
block.10 We assume that there are N > K users. Some of these users have
transactions waiting in the mempool at the time the current block is being
constructed and others are absent. We assume that the probability that a
9See, for example, Edelman and Schwarz [2010].
10For ease of exposition, our model uses the terminology used in popular proof of work
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Most cryptocurrencies operate on batches
of transactions analogous to blocks, and transaction priority is decided by user’s bids.
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user has a transaction in the mempool is δ where 1 > δ > 0 and users are
drawn iid. The users waiting in the mempool have heterogeneous values
for having their transaction recorded to the blockchain. These values are
denoted Vi and they are drawn iid according to a continuous density g on
[0, V¯ ] with g(V ) ≥  > 0 for all V ∈ [0, V¯ ]. A user who is not included in the
current block receives no reward from the current block.11
All users have attached transaction fees (bids) to their transactions de-
noted by fi ∈ [0, V¯ ]. We assume that distributions of users and values are
common knowledge. We model users as selecting bids after knowing their
own value and knowing how many users are active, but without knowing the
values or bids of other users. Miners select which transactions to put into
the block after seeing the bids attached to those transactions. We consider
only blocks for which the number of active users is greater than the number
of slots (K).
Users can attach any fee they like, or no fee, to their transaction. If the
miner of the current block places a user’s transaction in the block, then the
miner keeps the fee. A profit maximizing miner clearly selects the K highest
bids, or all bids if there are less than K bids, places those transactions on
the block, and earns those bids. The miner has no incentive to manipulate
by entering fictitious transactions as by doing so, he simply removes real
transactions and the fees they generate without changing the fees paid by
other transactions. So our model of the current protocol is in fact equivalent
to a generalized first price auction run by an auctioneer who can commit to
running this auction type.
Remark: Our model of bidding for slots in current cryptocurrency protocols
induces a generalized first price auction for the K slots on the current block.
The users with the K highest bids (proposed fees) win slots on the block and
each winning user pays his bid (fee).
Thus, from the users’ point of view the fee setting game is a generalized
first price auction for K identical items. This auction has a symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibrium in which equilibrium bids are increasing in values and so,
11For simplicity of exposition, we treat all transactions as taking the same amount of
space on the blockchain. In practice, the fees we discuss are normalized in some way. For
example, in Bitcoin, this would be the fee per byte. Dependent transactions, such as child
pays for parent, can be handled by charging the average fee for both transactions.
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in this equilibrium, the highest value transactions are placed on the block.12
In this equilibrium, realized social surplus, defined as the sum of the values
of users whose transactions are placed in the block, is maximized. Miner
revenue and the total payment by users net out and so do not affect social
surplus. Of course, this is an interim notion of social surplus as it takes
the winning miner as fixed and does not consider the cost of the mining
industry. We address these concerns later. Proofs of Results are included in
the Appendix.
Result 1: Our model of current cryptocurrency protocols applied to a single
block of size K induces a game which has a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium which is efficient.
If miners could commit to an auction form and the protocol could use all
bids to determine the assignment and payments, then it could be modified
to induce a generalized second price auction for the K slots. In this auction,
the K highest bidders would have their transactions placed on the block and
they would pay a uniform price equal to the K + 1st highest bid. In this
auction it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each bidder to bid his true
value. To see this, note that each bidders’ bid only affects whether or not
his transaction is placed on the block; it does not affect the price he will
pay if he gets on the block, as that price is the bid of a bidder who is not
successful. A bidder wants to be on the block if the price is no more than
his value and he does not want to be on the block otherwise. A bid equal
to his true value ensures this. Most importantly, note that this reasoning
does not depend on how many other bidders are present or on what they do;
so bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy. Bidders using their dominant
strategies result in maximum realized social surplus.
Result 2: If miners could commit to use a generalized second price auction
and the protocol could use all bids to determine the outcome, then the pro-
tocol could be modified to induce a generalized second price auction. In this
auction, truth-telling would be a (weakly) dominant strategy for users and
the assignment would be efficient.
12Symmetry of users matters for this claim. With asymmetric distributions, equilibria
are not symmetric, and efficiency need not occur. It also depends on our assumption that
each user has only one transaction in the mempool. If users are interested in multiple slots
on the block, then efficiency can also be lost.
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Because miners cannot commit to an auction form and the K + 1st bid
is not observable, this generalized second price auction is not feasible. Most
importantly, the miner’s ability to submit a fake transaction after observing
the fees in the mempool destroys the “truth-telling is a dominant strategy”
result.13 For a block with K slots the optimal fictitious transaction(s) by the
miner are not as simple as just matching the Kth highest bid; the equivalent
of matching the highest bid in one-unit “second price auction” thereby turn-
ing it into a first price auction. For example, suppose that K = 2 and there
are three transactions in the mempool with attached fees of f1 > f2 > f3.
Then there are two possible manipulations by the miner: (1) Insert a transac-
tion with fee equal to f2 and earn total fee of 2f2, or (2) Insert a transaction
with fee equal to f1 and earn total fee of f1. Manipulation (1) is better than
the generalized second price auction (for the miner) and (2) is better than
(1) if f1/2 > f2. Thus, the miner always has an incentive to manipulate
unless there are K + 1 bids of equal highest value.
4 Proposed Mechanism
To solve both the inability to use the K + 1st highest bid and the miner’s
incentive to manipulate, we propose the following protocol. In any cryp-
tocurrency, generating identities is very cheap so miners are able to create
blocks under new identities that they control. This protocol will produce the
same results for a miner independent of which identities they mine under,
removing this concern from our analysis.
Protocol
1. Label blocks by b = 1, 2, . . . .
2. Users who want a transaction recorded in block b can attach fees to
their transactions. Denote the fee attached by user i by fi.
3. Users whose transactions are included in block b each pay the minimum
fee proposed by any user whose transaction is included in block b. The
13If the miner could only submit fictitious transactions before observing the fees in the
mempool, then truth-telling would remain a dominant strategy for users. From the point
of view of users the miner is just acting as another user or users and this has no effect on
any user’s incentive to bid truthfully.
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total paid by the these users in block b is the revenue generated by
block b.
4. The miner who builds block b is paid the average revenue generated
by the B most recently mined blocks, including block b, if and only
if the miner fills block b. Otherwise, the block is not included in the
blockchain.
• A block is defined to be filled if it contains K transactions or
if the miner pays a fill penalty. The necessary fill level, K, is
a parameter which can be chosen to be some fraction, say 80%,
of the capacity of a block. The fill penalty is defined to be the
difference between K and the number of transactions in the block
times the fee paid by each transaction. A miner can also avoid
paying the fill penalty by declaring that there were not enough
transactions in the mempool to fill the block, in which case each
user is charged the minimum allowable fee for a transaction to be
included in the mempool.
• A minimum fee required for a transaction to be considered can be
included by declaring that transactions are not in the mempool if
the proposed fee is below that minimum level.14
• The miner has the option to fill the block to capacity with transac-
tions, but only K of them are priced using this auction mechanism.
The other transactions are charged no fees for being included in
this block.
The reward for a miner’s payment from transaction fees must incentivize
the miner to not manipulate the contents of the block and to place the
highest paying transactions from the mempool into the block. To deal with
both concerns, we set the miner’s reward to be the average revenue generated
over the last B blocks, including the block that the miner has just mined.15
The miner is incentivized to place the K highest value transactions into
the block for two key reasons. First, the miner is receiving a fraction of
the rewards in the block that they recently mined. Thus, they are directly
incentivized to maximize the rewards in this block. Additionally, miners are
14Including a minimum bid is standard in sponsored search auctions. For example the
minimum bid that Google currently uses is one-cent per click.
15The fill penalty is considered part of the reward for a block.
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paid in the underlying cryptocurrency and they typically maintain a position
in the cryptocurrency. So, they have an incentive to make the cryptocurrency
successful, which incentivizes them to put high value transactions into the
block; that is, to take the K highest fee transactions.16
The protocol incentivizes the miner to not manipulate the transactions
in a block due to the fill penalty. The optimal manipulation for a miner is
to insert fake bids that are equal to the minimum bid from some user that
the miner wants to include in the block. However, the fill penalty is equal to
the fees that the miner would pay to perform this manipulation. Since larger
blocks are more likely to get forked and excluded from the blockchain due
to random chance,17 a miner is incentivized to prefer smaller blocks, all else
being equal. Additionally, each fake transaction from the miner will require
the miner to pay the associated fee. Since each block’s reward is computed
over the past B blocks, the fees collected from a particular block are actually
spread over the next B blocks (including itself). Thus, the miner can only
get a fraction of her reward back on expectation.18 Exactly how many blocks
B to average over is an empirical question that will vary on a per-blockchain
basis.
Similarly, the protocol also incentivizes miners to place transactions that
have value to the miner using the space in the block not under the auction
mechanism. This enables the miner to capture the full value of the transac-
tion and include it in the blockchain without paying other miners a fee. This
includes transactions that have business value (e.g. payments to members in
their mining pool) or side payments from users to include their transaction
in the block.
Assuming that miners place the K highest fee transactions on the block,
and that users whose transactions are placed on the block all pay the Kth
highest fee, it is no longer a dominant strategy for users to bid truthfully as
the Kth highest bidder’s (who could ex ante be anyone) bid affects the price
16Note that which transactions (with fees above the minimum fee over all transactions
in the block) the miner places in the block (provided that he is not a party to those
transactions) has no effect on his revenue. So we are assuming that if he is otherwise
indifferent, concerns about the success of the cryptocurrency leads him to place the highest
value transactions on the block.
17Forking occurs when two blocks are mined that cannot both be included in the
blockchain (e.g. when they have the same height). Any block that is mined has a chance
of being forked, but larger blocks have a higher chance of being forked. The probability
of a fork occurring depends on the particular chain’s properties.
18This fraction is precisely equal to the fraction of mining power that this miner has.
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he pays. So users have an incentive to manipulate, however, that incentive is
small if there is a large number of users. To see this, suppose that all other
users bid truthfully. Let VK−1 and VK be the K − 1st highest bid of others
and the Kth highest bid of others. If a user’s value is below VK there is no
possible gain from bidding strategically as the price will be greater than the
user’s value for any bid. There is a potential profit from strategic bidding only
if the user’s value is greater than VK and this gain is bounded by VK−1−VK .
So given a user i with value Vi the gain to strategic bidding is bounded by
E[(VK−1 − VK)] which converges to 0 in the number of users. For example,
with draws of user values according to the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and
A active users, the upper bound on gain is 1/A and with the exponential
with parameter λ, it is 1/λ(A − K + 1). That is, with a large number of
users, the potential gain to strategic user behavior is small and it seems likely
that users will instead follow the simpler, nearly optimal, strategy of truthful
bidding.
Result 3: For the protocol and model above:
• Truthful bidding is not a dominant strategy for users.
• If all other users bid truthfully the expected gain to any bidder from
strategic bidding converges to 0 as the number of users diverges.
5 Large Number of Users
If the number of users is large, the protocol can be made simpler without
much chance of harm. Suppose that the protocol is modified to pay the miner
of block b the revenue generated by block b. A miner could now manipulate
by inserting a fictitious transaction with a fee equal to any of the K highest
fees offered.19 Relabeling the K highest fees from highest to lowest, they are
f1, f2, . . . , fK . For a miner to not manipulate, we need the revenue generated
from K transactions at the Kth highest bid to be greater than the revenue
generated from any smaller number of transactions n at the nth highest bid,
19Inserting a fee between two existing fees is clearly dominated by making the fictitious
fee equal to the higher of two nearby fees. Inserting multiple fictitious fees above the Kth
highest fee knocks some number of transactions out of the block and sets the price at the
lowest fee remaining in block and so is equivalent to a single fictitious fee strategy.
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i.e. KfK > (K − 1)fK−1, KfK > (K − 2)fK−2, and so on. This clearly
holds if it holds sequentially, i.e. KfK > (K − 1)fK−1, (K − 1)fK−1 >
(K−2)fK−2, and so on. This second collection of inequalities can be written
as nfn > (n − 1)fn−1 for each n = 2, . . . , K. Or fn > (n − 1)(fn−1 − fn)
for each n = 2, . . . , K. If users bid truthfully, then as the number of users
diverges, the left-hand side of this inequality converges to V¯ for any fixed n
and the right hand side converges to 0. So the miners’ gain from manipulation
vanishes as the number of active users grows.20
Result 4: Suppose there are K slots in the block. For both the generalized
first price auction and the generalized second price auction with uniform
price equal to the Kth highest bid and for any Bayes-Nash equilibria of the
these auctions, the ratio of realized social surplus to maximal social surplus
and the ratio of realized miner revenue to maximum miner revenue converges
to one with probability one.
So with a sufficiently large number of users, both miners and users have
little incentive to manipulate the generalized second price auction (with price
equal to the Kth highest fee).
6 Analysis
Our analysis aims to answer three key questions. First, we use simulation
in order to understand the miner’s incentive to manipulate the auction and
deviate from our proposed protocol. Second, we analyze bids during a period
where block space was scarce in Bitcoin and Ethereum to estimate how much
users are overpaying using a first price mechanism. Finally, we use the same
bids to estimate the reduction in variance from fee revenue for miners.
6.1 Miner Manipulation
To help understand a miner’s incentive to manipulate our proposed proto-
col, we ran a series of simulations. Our simulations show that the gain to
miners from manipulation decreases as the number of miners increases or as
20Note that inserting a fictitious transaction with fee greater than the Kth highest real
fee is equivalent to choosing to not fill the K slots on the block. So this argument also
covers the potential manipulation of restricting the supply of slots.
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the number of blocks we average over in determining miner fees increases.
Overall, our results support our claim that, for reasonable parameters, even
optimal manipulation by miners does not pay.
Our simulations take as parameters the number of transactions (N) that
are in the mempool, the number of transactions (K) that can be included
in a block, the number of miners (M) and the number of blocks that the
transaction fees are averaged over (B).
To run the simulations, we first draw user bids from a power law distri-
bution with a median of 2 cents and a mean of 10 cents, which is similar
the actual transaction fee distribution that appeared on the blockchain in
July 2018. The miner then chooses j real transactions to include in a block
(where j ≤ K) and then fills the rest of the block with fake transactions.
The total fee generated by this block is j times the jth highest bid from
the user distribution, which we denote as bj. Since the manipulating miner
solved this block, he receives
bj
B
as a reward from fees on this block.
A miner with 1
M
of the hashpower on expectation will receive
bj(B−1)
MB
in
fees because this miner is expected to mine 1
M
of the other B− 1 blocks that
the transaction fees are averaged over. Finally, we subtract the amount that
the miner paid to insert fake transactions and manipulate the fees, which
is (K − j)bj. We then take the maximum over all possible values of j and
define the gain as the maximum value minus the miner revenue when j = K
and the miner has been honest—not inserted any fake transactions into the
block. We average this over 1000 trials to compute the total gain. In all of
our results, we keep the number of transactions in a block, K, fixed at 2000.
Figure 2 shows miner’s gain from optimal manipulation as the number of
miners increases for various levels of the number of blocks we average over.
The gain from manipulation declines as the number of miners increases and
this decline is most pronounced if the number of blocks averaged over is
large. This occurs because as the number of miners increases the probability
of any individual miner winning a block declines and payment is averaged
over (B) blocks while the cost of manipulation in a block does not depend
on the number of miners or the number of blocks averaged over.
Figure 3 shows that the gain from optimal manipulation declines as the
number of blocks averaged over increases and that it is uniformly lower for
high numbers of miners. This occurs because the cost of manipulation is
fixed and the expected gain declines as more blocks are averaged over.
Our simulation results show that miners do not gain much from manipu-
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lation, even if they do it optimally, for reasonable numbers of miners, users
and blocks averaged over. Miner revenue ranges from $15 to $40 over these
simulations, so the gain from manipulation relative to total revenue is very
small for reasonable numbers of miners and blocks averaged over. Of course,
this does not take into account the miners incentive to make Bitcoin succeed
so as to maintain the value of their Bitcoin holdings and the ongoing value
of the mining operation. We believe that taken together these results argue
that miners are not likely to manipulate our proposed protocol.
6.2 Blockchain Bid Analysis
To help understand the concrete benefits of our proposal, we analyze the
actual bids that appeared on the blockchain during a period of high demand
in Bitcoin (December 2017). Note that Bitcoin, during this time interval, is
still operating with a protocol equivalent to a generalized first price auction.
Thus, the bids that we analyze are likely lower than the utility of the users.
We first examine how much clients could save using the auction mecha-
nism that we propose in this paper. To apply our mechanism to each day, we
take all of the blocks that were mined that day and look at the transactions
in each block. We then calculate the fee per byte for each transaction to nor-
malize the fees paid, and then have every transaction pay the smallest fee per
byte that appears on the block per our mechanism. Then, we plot the differ-
ence between the actual fees paid and the fees that users would pay under our
mechanism. Figure 4 shows that the difference in Bitcoin is quite substantial
and that under times of high demand, there is a significant amount of so-
cial waste generated by the generalized first price auction. Figure 5 shows a
similar trend in Ethereum, but the dollar amounts are significantly smaller,
which is to be expected as Ethereum has a higher processing capacity than
Bitcoin.
Our mechanism has the potential to improve predictability by reducing
variance. To quantify this, we use the same calculation as before to obtain
the fees that miners would receive under our mechanism. This time, we take
the variance of the transaction fees on each block using the second price
mechanism and the current first price mechanism. Figure 6 shows that the
variance is lower in Bitcoin when using the second price mechanism, by up
to a factor of 20 on some days. Figure 7 shows that the same trend holds
in Ethereum as well. Additionally, the results in Figure 6 and Figure 7 both
assume that each block’s payment only goes to one miner. In our mecha-
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nism, payouts are averaged over B blocks, which would further decrease the
variance by an additional factor of B2.
Our bid analysis shows that, using our proposed protocol, we are able to
avoid social waste for users and decrease miner payout variability. So, our
mechanism is likely to perform well in practice, especially during periods of
high demand.
7 Conclusion
Cryptocurrencies cannot go mainstream if constructing a transaction imposes
a cognitive load or requires complex strategic bidding behavior. We show
that the fee mechanism currently used in a variety of coins encourages users
to employ complex bidding strategies. We then present an alternative that
obviates this need and offers a more stable, predictable fee market.
Both the generalized first price and generalized second price auctions work
well in equilibrium if there are a large number of users relative to the capacity
of blocks. So why is the generalized second price auction preferable? In the
generalized second price auction the transaction fee offered by a user only
affects what a successful user pays if the user has the (unique) Kth highest
bid. Otherwise the fee only affects whether the user is in the block or not in
it. So the gain to strategic bidding is small if there are many users. But with
a first price auction every user pays the fee that he offers if his transaction
is in the block. Here, strategic bidding is inescapable although its gain does
converge to zero as the number of users grows. This robustness of the second
price procedure makes it more desirable than the first price procedure even
if the two would have similar surpluses in equilibrium.
How the choice of procedure (first or second price) affects miner revenue
from fees is unclear. In equilibrium, there is revenue equivalence; the two
procedures should produce approximately the same expected revenue. Em-
pirically, we see that the miner revenue will have a lower variance payout
under the second price procedure. But what happens to the actual payout
when the game is played by real users and miners is unclear, at least in part
because of the non-robustness of the first price procedure.
Finally, we note that our analysis applies to proof-of-work protocols such
as those used in Bitcoin, Ethereum and many others. Alternative protocols
are being considered and used in a variety of different digital currencies. Most
notably, Ethereum is considering a switch to proof of stake. Regardless of
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the protocol, cryptocurrencies will need to prioritize transactions somehow.
Most cryptocurrencies charge fees to use the network and induce a first price
auction. Thus, they face the same problems described above.
8 Appendix
Proof of Result 1: By the Remark in the text this result is equivalent to
showing that a discriminatory, multi-unit, first price auction has a symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which bids are increasing in values. This is a
standard result, see Weber [1983] and Milgrom [1985].
Proof of Result 2: The modification yields a multi-unit, second price
auction. The result that this auction has weakly dominant strategies and
an efficient equilibrium is a standard result, see Weber [1983] and Milgrom
[1985].
We provide a simple, direct proof of this claim as we use the logic else-
where in the paper. Consider bidder i with value vi. We need to show that
bidding more than vi or less than vi cannot increase the profit of bidder i.
Consider a bid bi > vi. Bidder i’s bid only affects whether he wins or
loses the auction; it does not affect the price he pays conditional on winning.
So this high bid only changes the payoff to i if bidder i would not win with
a bid of vi and would win with a bid of bi. That is, only if bi > v
K > vi,
where vK is the Kth lowest bid of the other bidders. In this case i wins with
a bid of bi, but pays v
K > vi as v
K is now the K+1 st highest bid. So high
bidding reduces i’s payoff.
Alternatively suppose that i bids bi < vi. This only affects i’s payoff if
i would have won with a bid of vi and does not win with a bid of bi. That
is, only if vi > v
K > bi. In this case i would have won with a bid of vi and
paid vK < vi and does not win with a bid of bi. So a low bid also reduces i’s
payoff.
Proof of Result 3: Consider user i with value Vi and suppose that all other
users bid truthfully. Let VK−1 and VK be the K − 1st highest bid of others
and the Kth highest bid of others. If Vi > VK−1 and VK−1 > VK then a bid
by i of bi such that VK−1 > bi > VK gives i a slot on the block at price bi
while a truthful bid gives i a slot on the block at price VK−1 > bi. So truthful
bidding is not a dominant strategy.
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If a user’s value is below VK there is no possible gain from bidding strate-
gically as the price will be greater than the user’s value for any bid. If
Vi ≥ VK then user i would gain from a slot on the block. The price of that
slot will be VK−1 if bi ≥ VK−1, as VK−1 will be the lowest successful bid, and
it will be bi if VK−1 > bi > VK , as in this case bi will be the lowest successful
bid. So the gain that user i can earn from strategic bidding (a non-truthful
bid) is bounded by (VK−1 − VK), and this maximal gain can be earned only
if Vi ≥ VK . Thus, user i’s expected gain from strategic bidding is bounded
by E[(VK−1 − VK)] which converges to 0 in the number of users.
Proof of Result 4: Follows immediately from an application of Swinkels
[2001] and Jackson and Kremer [2006].
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Figure 1
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the sawtooth behavior of bids on
Overture when it was running a first price auction for ads to be
displayed in response to searches using its search engine. The figure
is reproduced from Edelman and Ostrovsky [2007].
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Figure 2
Figure 2: This figure illustrates the change in a miner’s gain from
manipulation as the number of miners increases. We keep the
mempool size fixed at 2000 and examine this gain as we vary the
number of blocks we spread the reward over (B). The simulation
shows that increasing the number of miners decreases the gain from
manipulation as long as we average over enough blocks.
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Figure 3
Figure 3: This figure illustrates the change in a miner’s gain from
manipulation as the number of blocks we average over increases.
The number of transactions in the mempool is kept fixed at 2000.
The simulation shows that increasing the number of blocks we av-
erage over decreases the gain from manipulation as long as there
are enough miners.
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Figure 4
Figure 4: This figure illustrates how much (in millions of USD)
that users could have saved if the transaction fees were using our
proposed scheme rather than the generalized first price auction in
Bitcoin in December 2017. We see that the daily savings is quite
large and this is roughly equivalent to the social waste of the fee
bidding scheme.
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Figure 5
Figure 5: This figure illustrates how much (in millions of USD) that
users could have saved if the transactions were using our proposed
scheme rather than Ethereum’s current scheme in December 2017.
As Ethereum has higher throughput than Bitcoin, the savings are
not as high.
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Figure 6
Figure 6: This figure illustrates the variance (in BTC2) of the pay-
outs from transaction fees to each miner for each day in December
2017. We see that the first price auction has a significantly higher
variance than the second price auction mechanism, resulting in less
stable payouts for miners.
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Figure 7
Figure 7: This figure illustrates the variance (in ETH2) of the pay-
outs from transactions fees to each miner for each day in December
2017. We see that the first price auction mechanism has a signifi-
cantly higher variance than the second price mechanism.
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